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Abstract 
The role of anterior temporal lobes (ATLs) in semantic processing is controversial. One 
theory, influenced by semantic dementia (SD) patients, is that this region is a pan-modal hub 
for all concepts. An alternative view is that atrophy in SD specifically affects knowledge for 
visual features. This is supported by reports of reverse concreteness effects in a few SD 
patients, suggesting that abstract word knowledge is spared relative to concrete words. 
However, it is not clear whether such effects are typical in SD, hence reliably associated with 
ATL damage, because most reports are of single cases and group studies have produced 
conflicting results. To address these contradictions, we investigated concreteness effects in 
seven SD patients, using multiple tests from earlier studies in addition to new assessments. 
Comprehension was impaired for both word types but was better for concrete words. 
However, this pattern was not found uniformly across all tests and was most likely to be 
observed when: 1) concrete and abstract words were well-matched for word frequency; 2) 
concrete and abstract words were selected with sufficient variation along the imageability 
scale. These factors account for the variability in previous studies and indicate that reverse 
concreteness effects are not common in SD. 
 
Keywords: concrete; abstract; anterior temporal lobe; semantic knowledge; hub-and-spoke. 
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Introduction 
 Semantic dementia (SD) is a progressive disorder in which atrophy of the anterior 
temporal lobes is associated with profound deterioration in conceptual knowledge. Due to its 
focal pattern of atrophy and highly selective neuropsychological presentation (other aspects 
of cognition, including phonology, syntax, visuospatial skills and executive function are 
typically preserved until the late stages of the disease), SD is a critically important disorder 
for elucidating the neural basis of semantic memory and forms the foundation stone for the 
“hub-and-spoke” theory (Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007; Pobric, Jefferies, & Lambon 
Ralph, 2010b). This model posits that conceptual representation arises from the interaction of 
modality-specific association regions (“spokes”) with a central, modality-invariant hub. 
Representations in the hub are sensitive to patterns of variation across multiple sensory 
modalities, which are necessary to code the complex non-linear relationships between 
features and concepts (Lambon Ralph & Patterson, 2008; Lambon Ralph, Sage, Jones, & 
Mayberry, 2010). Accordingly, impairment in function of the hub accounts for the selective, 
multi-modal semantic impairment seen in SD (Rogers et al., 2004). The focal atrophy in SD 
points to the inferior aspects of the anterior temporal lobes (ATLs) as the site of the semantic 
hub, as both cortical atrophy and hypometabolism are centred on this region (Gorno-Tempini 
et al., 2004; Mummery et al., 2000; Nestor, Fryer, & Hodges, 2006; Williams, Nestor, & 
Hodges, 2005). In addition, three independent lines of evidence support this conclusion: 1) 
Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation applied to the lateral ATLs in healthy subjects 
produces a selective slowing for verbal and non-verbal semantic tasks (Lambon Ralph, 
Pobric, & Jefferies, 2009; Pobric, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2007, 2010a); 2) fMRI reveals 
inferolateral ATL activation for semantic tasks (Binney, Embleton, Jefferies, Parker, & 
Lambon Ralph, 2010; Visser, Embleton, Jefferies, Parker, & Lambon Ralph, 2010), provided 
various methodological issues are accounted for (see Visser, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 
2010); and 3) neuroanatomical studies indicate that the ATLs are well-placed to perform an 
integrating function due to their strong connectivity with multiple sensory association areas 
(Catani & de Schotten, 2008; Gloor, 1997; Moran, Mufson, & Mesulam, 1987). 
 An alternative account of SD holds that ventral temporal lobe atrophy affects 
modality-specific cortex that is crucial for coding the visual properties of objects (Bonner, 
Ash, & Grossman, 2010; Bonner et al., 2009; Breedin, Saffran, & Coslett, 1994; Macoir, 
2009; Yi, Moore, & Grossman, 2007). This view is supported by a series of reports of SD 
patients who show poorer comprehension of concrete words than of abstract words (Bonner 
et al., 2009; Breedin et al., 1994; Cipolotti & Warrington, 1995; Macoir, 2009; Papagno, 
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Capasso, & Miceli, 2009; Reilly, Peelle, & Grossman, 2007; Warrington, 1975; Yi et al., 
2007). This intriguing pattern of performance, sometimes termed a “reversal of the 
concreteness effect” and which we will refer to as an A>C pattern, is in stark contrast to the 
processing advantage shown for concrete words by healthy participants (Degroot, 1989; 
James, 1975; Kroll & Merves, 1986) and often found in aphasia following stroke (Coltheart, 
1980; Franklin, 1989; Hoffman, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2010; Hoffman, Rogers, & 
Lambon Ralph, in press; Katz & Goodglass, 1990). The A>C effect suggests that knowledge 
of visual properties is disproportionately impaired in SD: visual information is thought to be 
integral to knowledge of concrete objects but is less relevant for abstract words, which may 
rely more on verbal associations (Paivio, 1986). In contrast, the hub-and-spoke account 
provides no obvious explanation for A>C comprehension, since there is no reason to suppose 
that concrete concepts should depend on the hub to a greater extent than abstract concepts. In 
fact, in a recent rTMS study, stimulation of the ATLs in healthy subjects produced a more 
severe impairment for abstract words, suggesting that disrupting the hub produces a C>A 
pattern (Pobric, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2009). 
 It is important to note that, until recently, all reports of A>C effects in SD came from 
single case studies. These studies are detailed and thorough and, in our view, leave little 
doubt that the concrete words can be disproportionately impaired, at least in a few carefully 
selected individuals. However, these isolated single cases give us no information about 
whether the A>C pattern of comprehension deficit is a typical feature of comprehension 
impairment in SD. It may be that A>C SD cases are rare and that they are over-represented in 
the literature because they are a striking deviation from the expected pattern. This is an 
important clinical issue because at least one set of diagnostic criteria for SD include 
preserved knowledge of abstract words as a typical feature of the disorder (Grossman & Ash, 
2004). It is also key to theories of the neural basis for conceptual knowledge. If A>C effects 
are one of the cluster of symptoms reliably associated with SD, then any model of conceptual 
knowledge must be able to account for them. If, on the other hand, A>C effects are an 
idiosyncratic feature only found in a small subset of SD patients, then they should not form 
part of our general explanation of knowledge impairment in SD. Instead, we should ask what 
causes these occasional cases to deviate from the usual pattern. 
 In light of these concerns, three recent studies have explored concreteness effects in 
larger, unselected groups of SD patients. Yi et al. (2007) used a description-to-word matching 
task and found a A>C pattern for knowledge of verbs, with nine of the twelve participants 
showing an effect in this direction. However, there was no such effect for noun knowledge. In 
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a follow-up study, Bonner et al. (2009) tested eleven patients with a synonym matching task 
and found a similar A>C pattern at the group level (though the effects in both of these studies 
were much smaller those seen in earlier single case reports). In contrast, Jefferies et al. (2009) 
gave a synonym judgement task to eleven SD patients and found a robust C>A effect across 
the group, a pattern that was present at a statistically significant level in all eleven 
individuals. Taken together, these studies give no clear answer to the question of whether  
 the A>C pattern is reliably observed in SD. It is difficult to uncover the reason behind the 
conflicting results because each study used different patients, which may have differed in 
important ways  (e.g., level of severity), and used different tests, which may have differed in 
terms of their demands and in the properties of the stimuli. In the present study, we 
investigated whether stimulus factors could account for the differences between studies. We 
directly compared several concreteness tests in a single set of seven SD patients. This case-
series spanned the full range of severity observed in the disorder. The tasks used by Jefferies 
et al. (2009), Yi et al. (2007) and Bonner et al. (2009) were included, along with an existing 
task that probes associative knowledge (Shallice and McGill, unpublished) and a new test 
designed to probe associative knowledge from pictures and words. In total, there were 436 
observations per patient, making this to our knowledge the most detailed investigation of 
concreteness effects in SD to date.  
 By using multiple tests in the same set of patients, we were able to determine whether 
differences between tests could account for the contradictions in the literature. More 
importantly, by averaging results across multiple patients and multiple tests, we were able to 
assess the nature of concreteness effects in SD while avoiding distortions in the data caused 
by a) the presence of one or two atypical patients or b) the possibility that a particular test 
gave inconsistent results. In addition to assessing patient performance, we also examined the 
characteristics of the tests themselves with regard to two key psycholinguistic properties: 
word frequency and imageability. Word frequency strongly influences comprehension in SD, 
with more familiar words and the concepts they refer to being less susceptible to degradation 
(Funnell, 1995; Jefferies et al., 2009; Lambon Ralph, Graham, Ellis, & Hodges, 1998). If this 
variable is not rigorously controlled, apparent A>C effects can emerge because abstract 
words tend to be more familiar than concrete words (Bird, Lambon Ralph, Patterson, & 
Hodges, 2000). Imageability refers to the ease with which a word elicits a mental image and 
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thus distinguishes between concrete and abstract words
1
. The more concrete and abstract 
words in a particular assessment differ in this respect, the more reliably the assessment will 
be able to reveal concreteness effects. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Seven patients with a clinical diagnosis of SD were recruited from memory clinics in 
Bath, Liverpool and Manchester, UK. Patients fulfilled all of the clinical criteria for SD 
(Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992): they had word-finding and comprehension 
difficulties in the context of fluent and grammatically correct speech and they also showed 
non-verbal semantic deficits. Visuospatial skills, executive function and day-to-day memory 
were relatively preserved. Imaging (MRI or CT) revealed bilateral ATL atrophy in all cases, 
although with a degree of asymmetry in each case. Four cases showed the more common 
pattern of greater atrophy in the left ATL, while three displayed more severe damage to the 
right ATL (see Table 1). 
 Patients completed a range of background neuropsychological tests, summarised in 
Table 1. To assess general cognitive function, the Addenbrookes Cognitive Examination – 
Revised (ACE-R; Mioshi, Dawson, Mitchell, Arnold, & Hodges, 2006) was administered. 
This revealed impairment in all patients on the language and memory sections; in contrast, 
visuospatial and orientation elements were relatively preserved. Attentional and executive 
skills were assessed with forward and backward digit span (Wechsler, 1987) and Raven’s 
coloured progressive matrices (Raven, 1962). Two subtests from the Visual Object and Space 
Perception battery (Warrington & James, 1991) were given to assess visuospatial skills, along 
with direct copying of the Rey complex figure (Rey, 1941). Scores were largely within the 
normal range on these tests, although two of the more severe patients were impaired in the 
Rey figure copy and one also showed signs of poor executive function on the progressive 
matrices. 
 We assessed semantic knowledge with the Cambridge semantic battery (Adlam, 
Patterson, Bozeat, & Hodges, 2010; Bozeat, Lambon Ralph, Patterson, Garrard, & Hodges, 
2000), which probes knowledge of the same 64 concrete items (animals, birds, fruit, 
                                                 
1
 Although this is a minor point, it is worth noting that technically there is a distinction between imageability, 
the ease with which a word elicits a mental image, and concreteness, the degree to which it refers to a physical 
entity. In practice, the two measures are very strongly correlated (r > 0.8) and are used by most researchers 
interchangeably. We chose to use imageability values to analyse the tests because they are more commonly used 
in the literature and are more widely available than concreteness ratings. 
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household objects, tools and vehicles) across different input and output modalities. The 
following tests were administered: (a) picture naming, in which the 64 items were presented 
as black-and-white line drawings; (b) spoken word-picture matching, in the correct item must 
be selected from a field of 10 objects from the same category; (c) the Camel and Cactus test, 
an associative matching task in which a concept is presented and a semantically related item 
is selected from four alternatives (e.g., which goes with camel: rose, tree, sunflower or 
cactus?). The four choices were presented as pictures and as written words in separate tests; 
(d) category fluency, in which the patient produced as many items from a given category as 
possible in one minute. These tests revealed multimodal semantic impairments in all patients, 
with each failing at least four out of five tests. Their scores revealed a broad spectrum of 
severity in semantic impairment, from DF who was very mildly impaired across all tests to 
ET whose picture naming was at floor and who was severely impaired on the other tests. 
Consequently, we were able to assess the status of concreteness effects at all stages of 
semantic impairment observed in SD. 
-Table 1 around here- 
 
Concrete-Abstract tests 
 Patients completed seven tests that contrasted concrete and abstract word knowledge. 
The first five had been used previously to compare concrete and abstract word 
comprehension and are described briefly below. The final two were designed for the present 
study and are described in more detail. All tests used a multiple-choice format but for a 
variety of different semantic judgements: word-word synonym matching, verbal description-
word matching and word-word and word-picture matching on the basis of semantic 
association. Thus a number of different types of semantic judgement were included, as were 
both verbal and pictorial stimuli, allowing us to ascertain the consistency of concreteness 
effects across multiple tests within the same set of patients. Where tests involved written 
words these were also read aloud by the experimenter. In all tests, patients were encouraged 
to guess if unsure of the answer. Example trials for each task are shown in Figure 1. 
-Figure 1 around here- 
 Synonym Judgement task (Jefferies et al., 2009) (Panel C): Patients were presented 
with a probe word and selected from three choices the word with a similar meaning. The foils 
were unrelated to the probe/target. The full test crossed two levels of frequency with three 
levels of imageability. However, to allow direct comparison with the other tests, we analysed 
only the highest and lowest imageability conditions and collapsed across both levels of 
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frequency. There were 64 trials in total, composed of 56 nouns, five adjectives and three 
verbs. Words were presented in a written format and were also read aloud. 
Description-to-noun matching task (Yi et al., 2007) (Figure 1, Panel A): Patients were 
presented with a short definition and selected from four choices the word being described. 
The three foils were semantically related to the target but did not fit the description. 
Descriptions and choices were presented visually and read aloud and the test comprised 20 
concrete and 20 abstract nouns. All stimuli were presented in writing and read aloud. 
 Description-to-verb matching task (Yi et al., 2007) (Panel B): This had the same 
format as the previous test but featured verbs rather than nouns. They were divided into two 
conditions based on whether they were a verb of motion (e.g., run) or a verb of cognition 
(e.g., decide). Motion verbs were considered by Yi et al. (2007) to be more concrete and 
cognition verbs more abstract. There were 20 trials in each condition. 
 Verb Similarity Test (Bonner et al., 2009) (Panel D): In this synonym matching task, 
two choices were presented on each trial and in each case the target was strongly associated 
with the probe and the foil only weakly related. The full test contained 48 items but, 
following Bonner et al., we used only the 20 highest imageability and 20 lowest imageability 
items, yielding 40 trials. Words were simultaneously presented visually and read aloud by the 
experimenter. 
 Shallice and McGill (unpublished) word-picture matching task (Panel G): This test 
has been commonly used for a number of years to assess concreteness effects (e.g., Breedin et 
al., 1994; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). A spoken word was presented to the patient and they 
selected a semantically related picture from four black-and-white line drawings. The 
relationship between the word and picture was somewhat different for concrete and abstract 
words. In the concrete condition, the picture was simply the object denoted by the word (e.g., 
“propeller” → picture of a propeller). In the abstract condition, it was associated with the 
word or represented behaviour associated with it (e.g., “caution” → picture of a woman 
waiting to cross a road). Accordingly, the abstract trials required a greater degree of inference 
and problem-solving ability. In addition, the images in this condition were more complex and 
often depicted scenes with multiple objects or people. There were 30 trials (all nouns) in each 
condition and there was also an emotion words condition that was not analysed in the present 
study. 
 Mischievous Monkey Test with pictures (MMT-picture) (Panel F): This was a new 
test designed to use the same format as the Shallice and McGill test while avoiding the 
confounds described above. Patients were given a spoken word and matched it to an 
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associated picture from a choice of four. Each set of images consisted of four items (objects, 
animals or people) belonging to the same semantic category. To design the tests, these were 
paired with a concrete noun and an abstract noun that were particularly related to one of the 
images (e.g., picture of a monkey → concrete: banana and abstract: mischief). The concrete 
and abstract words in each pair were matched for word frequency. During the task, each 
quartet of images was presented twice at different times: once with the concrete word and 
once with the abstract, with the spatial arrangement changed for the second presentation. 
Since the same sets of pictures were used in both concrete and abstract conditions, there were 
no differences in visual complexity or familiarity of the images. In a pilot study, 10 
postgraduate students from the University of Manchester completed the test and rated each 
trial on a five-point scale for the ease of selecting the correct picture and the strength of 
association between picture and word. These ratings did not differ for concrete vs. abstract 
trials (ease: concrete = 4.2; abstract = 4.3; t(47) < 1; association: concrete = 3.7; abstract = 
3.6; t(47) = 1.2, p > 0.1). The test contained 48 concrete and 48 abstract words. The test items 
are given in the supplementary material and the full test is available on the NARU website 
(www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/naru/). 
 Mischievous Monkey Test with words (MMT-words) (Panel E): This was an entirely 
verbal version of the previous task, constructed by replacing the pictures with written words. 
On each trial, the four words were presented visually and read out by the examiner and then 
the probe was presented in spoken form. 
 
Analysis of stimulus characteristics 
 Frequency and imageability values were obtained for all of the probe words, targets 
and foils used in the tests. We used lemma frequency counts from the CELEX database 
(Baayen, Piepenbrock, & van Rijn, 1993), which were log-transformed to reduce skew. To 
obtain imageability ratings for the largest possible number of words, we consulted five 
published databases: the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981), the Bristol 
imageability norms (Stadthagen-Gonzalez & Davis, 2006) and the ratings of Bird et al. 
(2001), Cortese and Fuggett (2004) and Clark and Paivio (2004). All of these databases 
contained ratings on a 7-point scale, which were multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. 
When a word appeared in more than one database, an average was taken. 82% of the words 
used in the tests were available in at least one database. 
 
Results 
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Patient Performance 
 Results: Mean performance on each task is shown in Figure 2 and the scores obtained 
by each patient in Table 2. To analyse concreteness effects across the entire group, we 
conducted a 2 x 7 repeated measures ANOVA with concreteness and task as the independent 
variables.
2
 This revealed a main effect of concreteness (F(1,6) = 12.5, p = 0.012). Overall, 
patients performed better on the concrete conditions of the tasks. There was also a main 
effect of task (F(6,36) = 10.1, p < 0.001) and a concreteness x task interaction (F(6,36) = 
4.85, p = 0.001), suggesting that the type of concreteness effect revealed varied across the 
different tasks. T-tests were conducted on the scores for each test to investigate the nature of 
the interaction in more detail. The Synonym Judgement task produced a highly significant 
C>A effect (t(6) = 10.5, p < 0.001). The C>A effect approached statistical significance in the 
MMT-picture test (t(6) = 2.33, p = 0.058) and the Shallice and McGill test (t(6) = 1.88, p = 
0.11). There were no significant differences between the two conditions for any of the 
remaining tasks. On the two description-word matching tasks there was a slight numerical 
advantage for abstract words, although this did not approach statistical significance in either 
case (Description-noun: t(6) = 0.3, p = 0.82; Description-verb: t(6) = 1.0, p = 0.36). 
-Figure 2 and Table 2 around here- 
 Chi-square tests were used to test for the presence of concreteness effects in 
individual patients (see Table 2). On the Synonym Judgement task, the four mildest patients 
showed a significant C>A effect. In the three remaining cases the effect was in the same 
direction but was perhaps smaller because these patients were approaching chance levels of 
performance. There were also significant C>A effects for the two mildest patients on the 
Shallice and McGill test but none of the other tests revealed significant concreteness effects 
at the level of individual patients. When all tests were combined, the two mildest patients 
showed a significant C>A effect, as did one more severe patient. The numerical trend was for 
C>A in every patient except ET, who performed at chance levels on most of the assessments. 
 Discussion: Overall, patients showed better comprehension for concrete words, 
suggesting that A>C effects sometimes reported are not typical of SD more generally. 
However, there was some variation in the effects seen on different tasks, with the Synonym 
Judgement task producing the most robust C>A effect and some other tests showing no 
difference between the two conditions. We did not replicate the A>C effects for verbs 
reported by Yi et al. (2007) and Bonner et al. (2009). 
                                                 
2
 As PW was unable to complete the MMT-words test, the mean for the rest of the group was used as his score 
on this test. 
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Correlations between Concrete and Abstract Word Impairments 
 The hub-and-spoke model predicts that impairment for concrete and abstract words 
will be strongly correlated since both word types are underpinned by a single semantic 
system. However, if concrete and abstract impairments have different underlying causes this 
correlation may be weak or absent. Despite the relatively small number of patients, we found 
a very strong relationship between mean concrete and mean abstract word performance (r = 
0.95, p = 0.001; see Figure 3). Correlations were also computed for each test individually; 
abstract and concrete knowledge was significantly correlated on all seven tests (r > 0.67, one-
tailed p < 0.05). We also investigated the relationship between severity of semantic 
impairment and the size of the concreteness effect in each patient. Some authors have 
suggested that unusual concreteness effects emerge as the disease becomes more severe 
Bonner et al. (2010), while others claim that concreteness effects occur early in the disease 
before giving way to a more general deficit (Macoir, 2009). As a measure of overall severity 
for each patient, we took the mean of the picture naming, word-picture matching and picture 
CCT elements of the Cambridge semantic battery. There was no correlation between this 
severity measure and the size of the C>A effect (r = 0.2, p = 0.67). 
-Figure 3 around here- 
 
Analysis of Test Characteristics 
 Rationale: Having administered various assessments in a single set of patients, we 
found considerable variation in the effects revealed by the different tests. While some tests 
revealed C>A effects, others showed no concrete-abstract differences. This suggests that 
differences in task characteristics could have led to the current discrepancies in the literature. 
To shed light on this issue, we examined the word stimuli used in each task, focusing on the 
two key psycholinguistic variables of frequency and imageability. Word frequency is a strong 
determinant of comprehension in SD and must be rigorously controlled to avoid potentially 
spurious results (Bird et al., 2000; Funnell, 1995; Jefferies et al., 2009). Experimenters are 
usually careful to control for the frequency of the main probe words appearing in their tests 
(i.e., the words about which the patient is asked to make a semantic decision). However, 
multiple-choice tests also feature several possible matches to the probe. The frequencies of 
these foils and targets words are often not considered by experimenters, even though they 
also influence whether the patient responds correctly: patients are more likely to select the 
target and to eliminate the foils successfully if these are fully comprehended. Here, we 
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analysed the frequencies of the probe and choice words used in each test to determine 
whether there were any differences in word frequency between conditions that could bias the 
test toward producing a particular result. We also examined imageability ratings, which are 
judgements made by healthy individuals about how easily a word generates a mental image. 
They provide a quantitative measure of where words fall on the concrete-abstract spectrum. 
To be a sensitive indicator of concreteness effects, a test should maximise the difference 
between its concrete and abstract words on this measure. Highly concrete words should be 
associated with very strong mental images whereas it should be hard to generate much 
imagery at all for very abstract words. 
 Results: The top panels of Figure 4 show the frequency values for the probe words 
used in all tests (Panel A) and for the choice words for those tests with verbal choices (Panel 
B).
3
 The Shallice and McGill test was the only one to show a large discrepancy between 
concrete and abstract words for the probes. On this test, abstract words were higher in 
frequency than the concrete words (t(57) = 3.73, p < 0.001) whereas there were no frequency 
differences for any of the other tasks (all t < 1.4). The picture was different for the choice 
words. Here, both tests using verb stimuli featured abstract words that were significantly 
higher in frequency than concrete words (Verb Similarity Test: t(78) = 2.44, p < 0.02; 
Description-verb: t(118) = 2.07, p < 0.05). This is in line with Bird et al.’s (2000) observation 
that abstract verbs tend to be higher in frequency than concrete verbs, which can produce 
confounds if not explicitly controlled. These confounds suggest that the Shallice and McGill 
test and the two verb tasks could reveal A>C effects in SD patients that are actually driven by 
differences in frequency, not concreteness. The two verb tests have previously revealed small 
reverse concreteness effects in SD case-series (Bonner et al., 2009; Yi et al., 2007); it is 
possible, however, that these effects simply reflect uncontrolled differences in word 
frequency.  
-Figure 4 around here- 
 Imageability values for probe and choice words are presented in the bottom two 
panels of Figure 4. In this case, a clear distinction can be drawn between tests that used nouns 
as stimuli and those that used verbs. For all of the noun tests, probes in the concrete condition 
were much more imageable than those in the abstract (t > 10, p < 0.001). The Synonym 
Judgement task, however, had the largest difference in imageability values between concrete 
and abstract conditions, indicating that it is the most sensitive for detecting concreteness 
                                                 
3
 The MMT-picture and Shallice and McGill tests could not be included as they had pictorial choices and the 
MMT-word test because the same choice words were used in concrete and abstract conditions. 
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effects. In contrast, the Verb Similarity Test showed a much smaller difference between 
concrete and abstract words (although it was statistically significant; t(30) = 3.0, p = 0.005), 
and for the Description-verb task, concrete probes were not significantly more imageable 
than abstract probes (t(30) = 0.22, p = 0.8). Similar results were observed for the choices 
provided in each test. For the Synonym Judgement and Description-noun tasks, concrete and 
abstract words were well-separated along the imageability spectrum (Synonym Judgement: 
t(169) = 64.5, p < 0.001; Description-noun: t(89) = 15.8, p < 0.001). Concrete and abstract 
choices on the verb tasks were much more similar in terms of imageability (although for both 
tests they did differ significantly; Verb Similarity test: t(63) = 2.97, p < 0.05; Description-
verb: t(94) = 3.84, p < 0.001). These differences in the strength of concreteness/imageability 
manipulations are another potential source of variability between tests. We analysed the 
relationship between the size of the imageability manipulation employed by a test (difference 
in imageability between concrete and abstract words) and the size of the concreteness effect it 
revealed in the patients (difference in scores on concrete vs. abstract conditions). There was a 
significant positive correlation (r = 0.78, p < 0.05), indicating that larger C>A effects were 
seen for tests with more robust imageability manipulations. 
 Discussion: By analysing the characteristics of the words used in each test, we 
identified two key stimulus factors that could explain discrepancies between tests. (1) Choice 
words in the verb tests were higher in frequency in the abstract condition relative to the 
concrete condition, indicating that these tests have a natural bias towards revealing apparent 
A>C effects. (2) The strength of the concreteness manipulation was much weaker in the verb 
tasks, indicating that they are less sensitive to genuine concreteness effects. The combination 
of these two factors might explain why previous studies that have used verbs as stimuli have 
found apparent A>C effects in SD: these tests were not very sensitive to detecting 
concreteness effects, allowing the frequency bias to boost comprehension in the abstract 
condition over the concrete. In contrast, the Synonym Judgement task combines a large 
manipulation of concreteness with good matching for word frequency and consistently 
reveals a typical C>A pattern of impaired comprehension. 
 
General Discussion 
 We conducted a detailed case-series investigation of concreteness effects in SD, 
testing patients across the spectrum of disease severity. The study was motivated by a number 
of reports of individual SD patients who show reversed concreteness effects (Breedin et al., 
1994; Cipolotti & Warrington, 1995; Macoir, 2009; Papagno et al., 2009; Warrington, 1975). 
14 
These reports are significant because they suggest that, rather than a central semantic deficit 
for all types of concept (Lambon Ralph et al., 2010; Patterson et al., 2007; Pobric et al., 
2010b; Rogers et al., 2004), SD patients might have a specific deficit for visual feature 
knowledge that impacts mainly on concrete words (Breedin et al., 1994; Yi et al., 2007). The 
key question, which cannot be answered by isolated single-case reports, is whether A>C 
effects occur frequently enough to be considered part of the symptom complex reliably 
associated with SD. Recent case-series investigations using single assessments have provided 
conflicting answers to this question (Bonner et al., 2009; Jefferies et al., 2009; Yi et al., 
2007). In the present study, seven SD patients completed seven tests of concrete and abstract 
knowledge. A reliable C>A pattern was found, which was consistent across all patients. This 
finding is consistent with the Jefferies et al. (2009) study and indicates that in most SD cases 
concrete words are not disproportionately impaired. Instead, a general semantic deficit affects 
both types of word but concrete words are slightly less impaired, in line with the processing 
advantage for concrete words seen in healthy individuals (Degroot, 1989; James, 1975; Kroll 
& Merves, 1986). These results are in agreement with the effects of lateral ATL rTMS in 
healthy subjects (Pobric et al., 2009, which employed the same Synonym Judgement test used 
in this study) and with the view that bilateral ATL atrophy produces a general semantic 
deficit because this region is the key substrate for modality-invariant conceptual 
representations (Rogers et al., 2004). 
 By directly comparing the tasks used in earlier studies, we were able to identify two 
stimulus factors that accounted for the conflicting results in the literature. First, a robust 
manipulation of concreteness was necessary to reveal C>A effects reliably. Studies that have 
revealed A>C effects at the group level in SD contrasted motion and cognition verbs (Bonner 
et al., 2009; Yi et al., 2007), resulting in much smaller concrete-abstract differences in their 
test materials. Second, careful stimulus matching is necessary to avoid a confound in word 
frequency that can benefit abstract words. Because abstract verbs tend to be higher in 
frequency than concrete verbs, the abstract verbs used in previous studies have been more 
familiar to patients than the concrete verbs. This factor may have been instrumental in 
producing apparent A>C effects, as comprehension in SD is strongly influenced by word 
frequency (Bozeat et al., 2000; Jefferies et al., 2009). 
 
Why do the majority of SD patients show a C>A effect? 
 Of all the tests we analysed, the Synonym Judgement task featured the largest 
imageability difference between concrete and abstract words and of the 18 SD patients who 
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have completed this test in total (combining the present study and Jefferies et al., 2009) none 
have scored more highly for abstract words. On this basis, it is clear that the typical pattern in 
SD is for concrete words to be less affected than abstract words. Healthy individuals also 
show C>A effects in reaction times and accuracy for lexical decision (James, 1975; Kroll & 
Merves, 1986), reading (Strain, Patterson, & Seidenberg, 1995) and comprehension tasks 
(Holmes & Langford, 1976), suggesting that the performance of SD patients simply reflects 
an exaggeration of the normal pattern. One popular view is that concrete words enjoy a 
processing advantage because they have richer semantic representations (Paivio, 1986; Plaut 
& Shallice, 1993). In particular, Paivio’s (1986) dual-coding theory states that concrete words 
are richer because they are associated with sensory information in addition to being coded 
verbally. Is this approach compatible with the hub-and-spoke model, which states that 
impairment in SD is a pan-modal deficit? On this view, the modality-invariant 
representations stored in the hub are distilled from inputs it receives from multiple modality-
specific regions (Lambon Ralph et al., 2010; Patterson et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2004). The 
input for abstract words comes primarily from perisylvian language areas, as the concepts 
referred to by these words are experienced only in the verbal domain. Concrete words, in 
addition to their verbal representations, are likely to be associated with input from a wider 
range of modality-specific “spokes” as they have tangible referents that are experienced in 
the environment (e.g., Pobric et al., 2010b). As concrete words are associated with richer and 
more varied sensory experiences they provide a stronger input to the modality-invariant hub, 
permitting richer representations to be formed that are more likely to resist degradation. 
Relatively preserved comprehension of words with rich sensory representations is therefore 
compatible with the hub account. 
  
Why do a minority of SD patients show an A>C effect? 
 Although it is now clear that the typical pattern of performance in SD is for C>A, 
there are a handful of SD patients in the literature who show clear and substantial reversals of 
this effect that are consistent across multiple tasks and stimuli (Breedin et al., 1994; Cipolotti 
& Warrington, 1995; Macoir, 2009; Papagno et al., 2009; Warrington, 1975). What is special 
about these cases that causes them to deviate from the usual pattern? Here, we consider how 
behavioural and anatomical individual differences might give rise to A>C effects. From a 
behavioural perspective, it is possible that variation in premorbid experiences and educational 
background could influence how concrete and abstract words are affected by the disease. As 
discussed earlier, highly frequent or familiar words are less likely to become semantically 
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degraded in SD. Individuals who are particularly familiar with abstract vocabulary (relative 
to most of the population) might be predisposed to show less impairment for these words. In 
these cases, the experimenter’s careful matching for word frequency is sabotaged by the 
patient’s atypical premorbid experiences. In Table 3, we list the occupations of patients who 
have shown large A>C effects as a consequence of SD and other aetiologies. In most cases, 
they were professionals who would be expected to have above-average educational level and 
IQ. It could be that these individuals were particularly familiar with abstract terms and 
consequently these words were less affected by the disease than would usually be the case. 
However, whilst premorbid experience may explain many of the previous cases, it is unlikely 
to provide a complete explanation of reverse concreteness effects because not all highly 
educated SD patients show this pattern. One of the patients studied by Jefferies et al. (2009), 
for example, had a PhD yet displayed the same C>A pattern as the other cases. 
-Table 3 around here- 
 In addition to individual differences in premorbid experience, there is also variability 
across patients in the extent and distribution of cortical atrophy. Atrophy in SD always affects 
the inferolateral aspects of the anterior temporal lobes (Galton et al., 2001; Mummery et al., 
2000), thought to be the site of the modality-invariant hub (Binney et al., 2010). However, 
there is inevitably variation across patients in the precise distribution and extent of cortical 
atrophy. Indeed, patients diagnosed with SD are occasionally found to have Alzheimer’s 
pathology at post-mortem, which would be associated with a different pattern of degeneration 
(Hodges et al., 2010). Therefore, cortical atrophy can sometimes encompass other regions, 
including superior and posterior temporal regions that are associated with modality-specific 
“spokes”. There are two temporal lobe sites where an unusual distribution of atrophy in a 
particular patient could give rise to A>C effects in comprehension. First, the anterior portion 
of the superior temporal sulcus is associated with verbal comprehension (Hickok & Poeppel, 
2007; Scott, Blank, Rosen, & Wise, 2000; Sharp, Scott, & Wise, 2004). It is also more active 
for abstract than concrete words in imaging studies (Sabsevitz, Medler, Seidenberg, & 
Binder, 2005), as would be expected if the meanings of abstract words depend heavily on 
verbal associative knowledge. If this region were relatively spared in a particular patient (i.e., 
their pathology was focused especially on the anterior basal temporal area), comprehension 
of abstract words could be relatively preserved. The second key site is the ventral temporal 
lobe, posterior to the region of maximal atrophy in SD. This region is associated with visual 
feature knowledge for objects (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Martin, 2007) and is often 
more active for concrete words than abstract (Sabsevitz et al., 2005; Wise et al., 2000). 
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Atrophy in this region is likely to affect concrete words to a greater extent than abstract 
words, again giving rise to an atypical A>C pattern in comprehension. 
 Finally, though ATL atrophy in SD is bilateral in almost all cases, it is often 
asymmetric with either the left or right ATL bearing the brunt of the damage. It has been 
suggested that predominately left-sided atrophy leads to greater verbal semantic impairment 
while right-lateralised atrophy causes greater difficulty with non-verbal semantic knowledge 
(Gainotti, 2007; Snowden, Thompson, & Neary, 2004). Could variation in the distribution of 
atrophy across left and right ATLs give rise to differences in the concreteness effect? One 
might assume that while abstract word knowledge depends exclusively on verbal knowledge, 
comprehension of concrete concepts depends on understanding of their verbal attributes and 
their non-verbal sensory characteristics. On this basis, one would expect damage to the right 
ATL to affect concrete word knowledge disproportionately, because of the greater relevance 
of non-verbal semantic properties. This explanation is appealing because it links the atypical 
A>C comprehension pattern with the rarer right-sided presentation of SD (around three-
quarters of clinically-presenting SD cases have greater atrophy on the left; Hodges & 
Patterson, 2007).  However, we can offer two pieces of evidence that run counter to this 
possibility. First, our review of previously reported A>C cases indicates that the majority, 
including all four SD cases for which anatomical data were available, had predominately left-
sided pathology (see Table 3). Second, though the present study was not designed specifically 
to contrast left and right-sided atrophy in SD, our cohort happened to contain three patients 
with greater right ATL atrophy and four with the more typical left-sided pattern. There was 
no difference in the profiles of these patients with respect to the concreteness effects: the 
three right-sided cases (MT, PL and NH) showed C>A effects of similar magnitude to the 
left-dominant cases.
4
 
 
Conclusion 
 Striking reports of reverse concreteness effects in a handful of SD patients have led to 
claims that preservation of abstract word knowledge is a typical feature of the disorder. This 
suggests that loss of visual feature knowledge is key to understanding the condition and is 
less consistent with degradation of a pan-modal semantic hub. By investigating concreteness 
                                                 
4
 We conducted a 2x2 ANOVA on performance averaged over all seven tests, including concreteness as a 
within-subject factor and laterality of damage as a between-subjects factor. There was a main effect of 
concreteness (F(1,5) = 8.00, p < 0.05) but no effect of laterality (F(1,5) = 0.10) and no hint of an interaction 
(F(1,5) = 0.002). Though these results should be interpreted with caution due to the small number of cases, there 
is no evidence for any differences between left and right-sided cases. 
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effects with multiple tests in a case-series that covered the full range of disease severity, we 
have established that the typical pattern in SD is actually the opposite: comprehension of 
concrete words is slightly more preserved than that of abstract. This pattern was not seen 
uniformly across all tests, however, and two stimulus factors influenced whether it was 
observed. Tests that did not reveal a normal concreteness effect (and in previous studies have 
revealed apparent reverse concreteness effects) used higher frequency words to probe abstract 
word knowledge and employed less powerful manipulations of imageability. These factors 
can explain the conflicting results reported previously and, having taken them into account, 
there is no evidence that reverse concreteness effects are a typical feature of SD. 
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Table 1: Background details and neuropsychological test scores 
 
Test Max DF MT MB PL NH PW ET Control mean 
(range) 
Demographic          
Sex  M F F F F M F  
Age  64 61 61 72 68 73 80  
More atrophic temporal lobe  Left Right Left Right Right Left Left  
General Neuropsychology          
ACE-R 100 78 79 72 56 45 41 43 93.7 (85-100) 
Visuospatial          
Rey figure copy 36 36 36 33 31 21.5 34 23.5 34.0 (31-36) 
VOSP number location 10 10 9 10 7 9 10 7 9.4 (7-10) 
VOSP cube analysis 10 10 10 10 9 7 10 10 9.7 (6-10) 
Attention/Executive          
Digit span forward - 7 7 6 8 5 5 7 6.8 (4-8) 
Digit span backward - 4 5 6 5 4 4 6 4.8 (3-7) 
Raven’s coloured progressive 
matrices 
36 34 35 32 31 16 34 29  
Cambridge Semantic Battery          
Naming 64 54 45 31 22 14 8 0 62.3 (57-64) 
Word-picture matching 64 61 57 48 44 31 35 20 63.8 (63-64) 
CCT pictures 64 55 45 41 30 26 34 28 59.1 (51-62) 
CCT words 64 56 46 40 29 NT NT 14 60.7 (57-63) 
Category fluency (6 categories) - 57 65 45 26 16 22 9 95.7 (61-134) 
 
ACE-R = Addenbrookes Cognitive Examination – Revised (Mioshi et al., 2006); VOSP = 
Visual Object and Space Perception battery (Warrington & James, 1991). CCT = Camel and 
Cactus test (Bozeat et al., 2000). NT = not tested. 
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Table 2: Individual patient performance on experimental tests 
 
Test Condition Maximum  DF MT MB PL NH PW ET 
Synonym Judgement Concrete 32 32* 29* 29* 29* 18 22 20 
 Abstract 32 23 19 20 21 13 16 14 
Description-Noun Concrete 20 19 19 12 19 10 14 8 
 Abstract 20 19 20 13 17 12 9 13 
Description-Verb Concrete 20 14 16 12 17 12 11 11 
 Abstract 20 17 17 15 16 12 9 12 
Verb Similarity Test Concrete 20 19 15 9 17 11 13 12 
 Abstract 20 15 14 11 18 11 11 10 
Shallice & McGill Concrete 30 29* 18* 15 19 10 10 9 
 Abstract 30 17 10 15 12 11 9 10 
MMT-picture Concrete 48 35 34 30 23 20 23 16 
 Abstract 48 36 27 26 25 18 17 9 
MMT-word Concrete 48 40 36 30 19 20 NT 11 
 Abstract 48 40 32 28 22 18 NT 16 
          
All tests Concrete % 88* 78* 62 72 48 57* 43 
 Abstract % 77 67 60 66 47 43 43 
 
* indicates a significant C>A effect (chi-square two-tailed p < 0.05). MMT-picture = 
Mischievous Monkey Test with pictures; MMT-word = Mischievous Monkey Test with 
words. 
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Table 3: Occupations of patients showing large reverse concreteness effects 
 
Study Patient Occupation Aetiology More severely 
damaged hemisphere 
Warrington (1975) AB High-level civil servant SD Unknown 
Breedin et al. 
(1994) 
DM Professional with a Master’s degree SD Left 
Cipolotti & 
Warrington (1995) 
DRN Biological scientist SD Left 
Macoir (2009) SC Psychology professor SD Left 
Papagno et al. 
(2009) 
MC Teacher SD Left 
Warrington & 
Shallice (1984) 
SBY Naval officer (engineer) HSVE Symmetric pathology 
Sirigu et al. (1991) FB Engineering student and semi-
professional musician 
HSVE Symmetric pathology 
Marshall et al. 
(1996) 
RG Chartered accountant (interests 
included opera and reading Dickens) 
CVA Presumed left 
Warrington (1981) CAV Café owner Glioma Left 
SD = semantic dementia, HSVE = herpes simplex viral encephalitis, CVA = cerebral vascular 
accident. 
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Figure 1: Examples of concreteness tasks 
 
 
 
 
All examples are from abstract conditions. 
(B) 
(C) (D) 
(B) Description-Verb 
a behaviour where you say something 
 
speak          pose 
observe         hear 
(C) Synonym Judgement 
constant 
regular   essential   aware 
(A) Description-Noun 
a state of sudden overpowering terror 
 
calmness       relaxation 
madness           panic 
(D) Verb Similarity 
confirm 
verify           finish 
(E) MMT-word 
monkey            elephant 
kangaroo            zebra    
“mischief” 
 
(F) MMT-picture 
“faith” 
 
(G) Shallice & McGill 
“caution” 
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Figure 2: Mean accuracy on each task 
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Syn Judge = Synonym judgement; Desc-Noun = Description-noun matching; Desc-Verb = 
Description-verb matching; Verb Sim = Verb Similarity Test; S&McG = Shallice and McGill 
test; MMT-pic = Mischievous Monkey Test with pictures; MMT-word = Mischievous 
Monkey Test with words. Bars indicate standard error of mean, adjusted to reflect the 
between-condition variance used in within-subject designs (Loftus and Masson, 1994). 
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Figure 3: Scatterplot of patients’ performance on concrete and abstract word comprehension 
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r = 0.95 
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Figure 4: Frequency values for probes and choice words used in the various tests 
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Panel A shows mean values for probes and Panel B for choice words. * indicates that abstract 
words are significantly more frequent than concrete. Syn Judge = Synonym judgement; Desc-
Noun = Description-noun matching; Desc-Verb = Description-verb matching; Verb Sim = 
Verb Similarity Test; S&McG = Shallice and McGill test; MMT-pic = Mischievous Monkey 
Test with pictures; MMT-word = Mischievous Monkey Test with words. 
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Figure 5: Imageability values for probes and choice words used in the various tests 
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Panel A shows mean values for probes and Panel B for choice words. ~ indicates no 
difference in imageability between concrete and abstract words (where no symbol is shown, 
concrete words were significantly higher in imageability). Syn Judge = Synonym judgement; 
Desc-Noun = Description-noun matching; Desc-Verb = Description-verb matching; Verb 
Sim = Verb Similarity Test; S&McG = Shallice and McGill test; MMT-pic = Mischievous 
Monkey Test with pictures; MMT-word = Mischievous Monkey Test with words. 
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 Supplementary Material: Stimuli for Mischievous Monkey Test 
 
Concrete probe Abstract probe Target Foil 1 Foil 2 Foil 3 
runway descent aeroplane train bus boat 
nurse crisis ambulance lorry caravan coal truck 
rocket gravity astronaut American footballer motorcyclist diver 
twilight sonar bat vulture fly starling 
moonlight idleness bed table door fridge 
shelf wisdom book drum jug basket 
alcohol message bottle teacup kettle glass 
bakery sustenance bread toilet paper toothbrush water 
sugar treat cake fish bread mushroom 
cactus drought camel ostrich sheep goat 
holiday snap camera radio mobile phone television 
cake vision carrot onion corn cob tomato 
altar faith church house windmill barn 
student information computer camcorder microwave toaster 
yoghurt methane cow horse goat dog 
priest belief cross radiation barber's pole no entry 
policeman motive dagger spoon whisk paintbrush 
luncheon etiquette dinner plate radio toaster kettle 
lizard evolution dinosaur robot alien knight 
blood health doctor judge headmaster priest 
letter reply envelope cotton reel ashtray salt shaker 
prince spawn frog snake snail crocodile 
uniform appearance iron kettle toaster telephone 
court evidence judge gardener priest chef 
sailor alert lighthouse tower castle dome 
stopwatch elite medal scarf necklace tie 
wallet expense money sweets pencils leaves 
banana mischief monkey elephant kangaroo zebra 
mist ascent mountain beach iceberg field 
prison security padlock plug light switch nut 
pyramid thirst palm tree ivy oak tree Christmas tree 
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pirate imitation parrot peacock duck penguin 
handcuffs clue police officer nurse doctor firefighter 
carrot burrow rabbit dog tortoise cat 
grandmother motion rocking chair stool bench deckchair 
romance scent rose ivy dandelion carrots 
pencil measurement ruler screwdriver hammer scissors 
flour justice scales stopwatch tape measure thermometer 
missile duty soldier builder gardener chef 
bolt repair spanner pen baseball bat fork 
drainpipe phobia spider ant caterpillar butterfly 
battle conflict submarine speedboat submersible windsurfer 
sergeant territory tank tractor snow plough oil tanker 
crocodile calcium teeth ear nose eye 
gallery exhibit vase watering can coffee pot bucket 
auditorium harmony violin palette scroll statue 
money wish well windmill church house 
broom spell witch clown cowboy pirate 
 
